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Abstract 
 
Islam has been in China for hundreds of years and has been the religion to ten people groups in 
China, including the Uyghur people group. The Uyghurs have been under China’s domain since 
the mid-1700s and since then have stood out among the fifty-five recognized minority groups 
due to their ethnic differences in comparison to the Han majority. The Uyghurs have a rich and 
distinct history and cultural heritage, which is different than the Han majority culture. Since 2001 
there have been campaigns to curb religious freedom in China by controlling the Uyghurs’ 
autonomous region of Xinjiang, located in western China. The latest move to control and 
regulate Islam and the Uyghur people group is a multitude of reeducation camps in Western 
China that houses millions of the Uyghur people. A survey of Uyghur history and literature 
review reveal that the Uyghurs are in a crisis with a lack of religious freedom and a lack of 
media coverage on what is happening currently in Western China.  
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Islam in China: Uyghurs in Crisis   
Introduction 
 Within the millions of people who live in mainland China, two million of the 
1,339,724,852 people of China are Muslims. The Uyghurs, the second largest people group, have 
lived in China for centuries and have been important culturally to the Islamic community of 
China, Central Asia, and communities along the route of the old Silk Road. Recently, the 
Uyghurs have been in the global news due to a harsh set of rules and regulations forced on them 
by the Chinese government in one of China’s current pushes against terrorism and religion. 
While religious freedom is nearly nonexistent in China, Islam is especially targeted by the 
Chinese government. However, to understand the current situation in Western China, there must 
be an understanding of the Uyghur’s history, culture, and relationship with the Han Chinese, who 
have been in leadership positions in the Chinese government for a hundred years. There are not 
only multiple cultural and religious differences, but also an ethnic difference that has been 
important in the events of the last few years.   
What started as regulations and policies against teaching the native Uyghur tongue in 
schools has now become unknown numbers of Uyghur men, women, and children in reeducation 
camps. These camps are hard to reach and the Chinese government halts any non-Chinese media 
from getting anywhere near the camps so the Uyghur’s state is unknown. This is one of the most 
urgent human rights issues in the world currently, and it has mostly gone undocumented due to 
the Chinese government's ability to censor and hide what is happening in western China. To fully 
understand and advocate for the Uyghur people one must understand the history of Islam and the 
Uyghur people in China, the cultural distinctiveness of the Uyghur, and a timeline of the past 
fifteen years.   
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History of Islam in China: Origins to the 20th Century 
Before delving into the current context with the Uyghurs in modern China, a survey and 
basic understanding of the origin of Islam in China is important. Islam was founded in the early 
7th century and spread to most of the Arabian Peninsula in Muhammad’s lifetime. After his 
death, Islam spread to Asia and Africa via trade routes on land and sea. The Silk Road was one 
of these routes and a Muslim legend states that Muhammad’s uncle, Saad ibn Waqqas, visited 
China using the Silk Road on a missionary mission to meet the Chinese Emperor.1 Even though 
there is no historical proof of this visit, there is evidence of Muslims living in China’s mainland 
since the Tang Dynasty (A.D 618-907).2 Persian and Arab merchants settled along the Silk Road 
and Islam spread as they married Chinese women and built mosques and Islamic communities.3 
The early Chinese term for Islam in China was Hui Jiao (Hui teaching) which could have come 
from a word describing the ancestors of the Uyghur people, but now Hui refers to the largest 
Muslim minority group in China, who are both ethnically Chinese and Muslim.4 
There was religious tolerance in China under the Mongols, who grew in power and 
expanded their empire in the 1200s AD under Genghis Khan and his descendants, the Yuan 
dynasty. This unified most of Asia and parts of Europe under one monarch.5 While this tolerance 
 
     1 Melanie Jones-Leaning and Douglas Pratt, “Islam in China: From Silk Road to Separatism,” The Muslim World 
102, no. 2 (2012): 305. 
 
     2 Ibid. 
     3 Gui Rong, “Identity, Interaction and Islamic Practice,” in Hui Muslims in China, Current Issues in Islam 
(Leuven (Belgium): Leuven University Press, 2016), 10. 
 
     4 Dru. C Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism,” The China Quarterly 174, no. 174 (2003): 
453. 
 
     5 Jones-Leaning and Pratt, “Islam in China: From Silk Road to Separatism,” 312. 
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was beneficial for all religious groups in China, the Mongol rule was also ethnically beneficial 
for Muslim people groups because the Mongols catered to and favored non-southern Chinese 
people groups.6 These racial categories put Muslim groups like the Uyghurs into high positions 
in the Mongol government and gave them privileges that were not given to other racial groups. 
This allowed Muslims to build mosques and the Mongol rulers chose Muslim architects for the 
privilege of designing and building their palace in Beijing.7 After the fall of the Mongols, during 
the Ming Dynasty, Muslims in China began to see themselves as both Chinese and Muslim, 
bridging the two cultures into one unique identity.  
The 1600 and 1700s in China brought a desire for Islamic purity in Chinese Muslim 
communities, which strengthened Islamic identity in parts of China but this led to a desire to rule 
themselves under their religious laws. This was not encouraged by the Qing Dynasty, which in 
1759 conquered western Xinjiang, the homeland of the Uyghurs.8  The 1800s were complicated 
due to multiple religious rebellions involving Muslims, such as the Dongan Rebellion, which 
involved an Imam naming himself sultan of a new kingdom. This rebellion was squashed by the 
Qing rulers. The 1800s also introduced the arrival of the West onto Asian shores.  Russia was 
expanding its empire during this time as well and soon was partially in control of the Uyghur 
homeland, called Russian Turkestan.9 
The 20th century brought drastic changes to all of China, and the communist government 
that was established in 1949 enforced a strict religious intolerance. This was heightened under 
 
       6 Ibid.,312. 
      7 Jones-Leaning and Pratt, “Islam in China: From Silk Road to Separatism,” 312. 
       8 Ibid., 315. 
       9 Ibid., 316. 
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Chairman Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76) where religious buildings were 
destroyed or repurposed, and the youth of China were encouraged to turn religious family 
members over to the police.10 In primarily Islamic areas of China, mosques were closed and 
Arabic script was forbidden.11 Muslims were pushed to break Islamic dietary laws and eat pork 
and other unclean foods. There was a rest from the crackdowns on religion starting in the 1980s 
which continued well into the 21st century. However, in the last fifteen years, there has been a 
revival of the old ideologies on religion, and a return to traditional policies on religious 
intolerance.12 
Uyghurs in China: 6th Century to 1950s  
 The Uyghur people group was first documented in written historical records in the 6th 
century as a people group who lived between the Turkish Empire and the Tang Dynasty's 
empire.13 When the Turkish empire ended in the 700's the Uyghur people moved to Mongolia, as 
the Uyghur language and ethnicity are similar to the Turks. After  a century of  peace in 
Mongolia, the Uyghurs were driven south into Tang China by invaders.14 In Tang China, they 
adopted the Buddhism of the Chinese and Iranians and it was not until the Qarakhanid dynasty in 
the 10th century that Islam was introduced to the Uyghur people. Until the 1700s, multiple tribes 
 
      10 Ibid., 317. 
      11 Ibid.  
     12 Jones-Leaning and Pratt, “Islam in China: From Silk Road to Separatism,” 318. 
     13 David Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 23. 
 
     14 Ibid., 23. 
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of Mongols, Turks, and the ancestors of modern-day Uzbeks influenced the Uyghur people and 
left the Uyghurstan in a constate state of transience.15  
 It was in was in the 1700s when China entered the Uyghur narrative in a major sweep. 
The Qing dynasty invaded the Uyghur homeland and the Chinese have held control since the 
mid-1700s. The Qing rulers renamed the previously renamed Dzungar region or "Mogulistan 
Yuri yaki Yette Xeher”16 in the Uyghur tongue ( Mogulistan or the Land of Seven Cities)  to 
Xinjiang, which means "new borderland".17 The Chinese called the Uyghurs either Huizu or 
Chantou Hui, meaning turbaned Muslims18. The Qing originally tried to set up a puppet 
government in Xinjiang but after that failed, the Qing dynasty made Xinjiang into a military 
colony. Different parts of Xinjiang were separated into a northern, eastern, and southern circuits 
because Xinjiang became a transportation center for the Qing. However, the Uyghur people kept 
a system of hierarchy in the southern part of Xinjiang which the Qing set in high positions to 
administrate their rule.19 This hierarchical method known as the beg system, had leaders in 
groups with each group set in charge of particular duties. Within this system, Qing China 
rewarded Uyghur leaders who aligned themselves with the Qing. Uyghur religious leaders were 
not allowed to install sharia law, but there was a legal system with Muslim judges.20 
The Qing also implemented laws and rules that segregated Uyghurs from the Han 
Chinese. In Xinjiang, eighteen cities were set aside just for Han Chinese. Han soldiers in the 
 
     15 Ibid., 28. 
     16 Ke Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, 1930s to 1940s, trans. Carissa Fletcher (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2019), 28. 
 
     17 Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 28. 
 
     18 Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, 1930s to 1940’s, 5. 
 
     19 Ibid., 5. 
 
     20 Ibid., 7. 
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Xinjiang were forbidden to interact or marry Uyghurs, and Han Chinese from other provinces 
were not allowed into the area without authorization. One of the reasonings for these rules is that 
the Qing was founded by Manchus, a non-Han ethnic minority, who benefited from allegiance 
from minorities.21 Under the Qing dynasty, the Uyghur were pushed into the Chinese mainland, 
where they became a people who were not truly Chinese nor were they part of the majorly 
Muslim central Asia. 22  The Qing also had issues classifying the Uyghurs due to their ethnic 
differences from the Chinese and the Hui, the Chinese speaking Muslims of China’s interior.23 
In the 1800s the class system the Qing had implemented began to create tension due to 
exploitation of the people by high ranking officials. This along with the fear of jihad kept the 
Qing paying the Khanate of Kokand, modern-day Uzbekistan, to keep the Kashgar Khojas from 
starting jihad. The Khojas were important religious leaders to the Uyghurs and they did incite 
jihad in the early 1800s which was unsuccessful. Xinjiang was in a state of uprisings and chaos 
which escalated when a Kokand general named Yaqub Beg invaded Xinjiang. He established a 
regime through slaughtering Uyghurs and feigning Islamic piety.24 Another source of violence 
and unrest was that the Qing had been using the Xinjiang area as a prison and had been sending 
convicted criminals there for decades.25 After dismantling the Yaqub Beg regime, the Qing 
abandoned their policies on Uyghur separation and began to attempt to integrate them into the 
greater population of China. One method of integration was creating schools for Uyghur students 
 
     21 Ibid., 12. 
 
     22 Ibid., 14. 
 
     23 Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 39. 
 
     24 Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, the 1930s to 1940s. 
 
     25 Ross Holder, “Bridging Worlds: A Comparative Study on the Effects of Ethno-Religious Policies on China’s 
Muslims,” in Hui Muslims in China, 2016, 37. 
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in hopes to educate them in the Chinese classics so they would see themselves as Chinese and 
that cultural assimilation into mainland Chinese culture would be possible.26 There also was a 
removal of the beg system, which had been in place for hundreds of years.27  
In the late 19th century to the early 20th  century, Uyghurs and the Russians began a 
trading relationship and the Uyghur people group began to interact with other countries and 
ideas. Out of this exchange between cultures and countries, the Uyghur Enlightenment Period 
began.28 This period in Uyghur history saw a widespread cultural change and an establishment of 
usul ul-Jadid or Jadidism (new method) schools for Islamic education.29  The enlightenment’s 
center was in the Kashgar region of Xinjiang, where there was a rise in studying abroad, 
especially to Russia, and inviting teachers and religious leaders from other countries to come and 
educate Uyghur men and youths in Islam.30  
In Russia, Uyghur students began to interact with Tartars, who were also subjugated in 
their country. The exposure to other cultures and witnessing the freedom of Muslims in the 
Ottoman empire led a warlord Jin Shuren to lead the Uyghurs in an Independence movement 
called the Kumul Rebellion in 1931.31 In southern Xinjiang, populated with mostly Uyghurs and 
a limited Han population, the Uyghurs tried to establish “East Turkistan” using the Islamic 
terminology of jihad. The reason that these rebellions could happen was due to the cohesion 
 
     26 Yufeng Mao, “Muslim Educational Reform in 20th-Century China: The Case of The Chengda Teachers 
Academy,” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident, no. 33 (2011): 146. 
 
     27 Ibid., 147. 
 
     28 Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, 1930s to 1940’s, 29. 
 
     29 Ibid., 30. 
 
     30 Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, the 1930s to 1940s. 25. 
 
     31 Ibid., 24.  
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under the religion of Islam.  During this era, the Chinese Republic era, the power was held firmly 
by Han Chinese, and there was little to no industrial progress in Xinjiang.32  
The 20th century brought drastic changes to China as well as the Uyghur people.  As 
China grew into a communist empire, the freedoms previously given to Islam and all other 
religions in China were taken away.33 As China’s identity changed from their ancient traditions 
of a dynasty, dragon throne, and the Mandate of Heaven to a communist party and socialism, the 
whole of China was cataclysmically changed. The new Chinese government under Chairman 
Mao divided China into 31 divisions in which each division would have a provincial government 
but be under the ultimate authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
While Mao believed that the Han Chinese were the primary people of China, he also 
believed that minorities should be represented.34 During this era, the CCP recognized fifty-five 
minorities as official peoples of China, including the Uyghurs, and allotted each minority a chair 
in the People’s Congress.35 However, in order for the people to have their own province or 
autonomous region like Xinjiang was designated, the CCP would be able to station the People's 
Liberation Army in every region.36  Due to these reforms, the Uyghur peoples officially had their 
own autonomous region and the possibility of governing themselves in alignment with Beijing. 
However, this was not the reality of the Uyghur people even though it had been established in 
official documents.  
 
     32 Ibid., 25. 
 
     33 Matthew S Erie, China, and Islam: The Prophet, the Party, and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
50. 
 
     34 Douglas Howland, “Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy,” 
Modern China 37, no. 2 (2011): 182. 
 
     35 Ibid 184. 
 
     36 Howland, “Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy,” 185. 
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 Socialism swept through the country and in Xinjiang it meant that the corruption of the 
Uyghur elite was confronted. Before the communist takeover, the Uyghur people had been 
oppressed by their own wealthy leaders who owned almost everything and left the peasants 
nearly destitute.37 When the CCP set up a government in Xinjiang, they took the wealth and land 
owned by the wealthy were redistributed to the poor. Three wealthy Uyghur leaders were 
executed.38 Communes were established which was disastrous because the people worked so 
long in the fields that it strained families, it limited access to Islamic cleansing and prayer, and it 
left no time for traditional arts important to Uyghur culture.39 This early stage of socialism 
affected all people in China similarly, but the collective farms especially affected Muslims due to 
the required prayer times throughout the day. 
China and Minorities 
 A quick survey of the history of China and Uyghurs reveals a few patterns of how China 
has handled their vast country and millions of minority peoples. The Qing dynasty tried to 
separate the Uyghur people from the Han in an attempt to keep Islam from growing, and to keep 
the allegiance of non-Han people groups.40 The separation of the Han and the Uyghur peoples 
was seen as necessary until their multiple rebellions and jihads.41 After the 1800s, the declining 
Qing dynasty realized that if they wanted to remain in control of all the people in China that 
separation was not the answer. One of the Qing Dynasty’s goals was to change the previously 
 
     37 Anna Hayes and Michael Clarke, eds., Inside Xinjiang, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), 118. 
 
     38 Ibid., 119.  
 
     39 Ibid., 120. 
 
     40 Wang, The East Turkestan Independence Movement, 1930s to 1940’s, 119. 
 
     41 Holder, “Bridging Worlds: A Comparative Study on the Effects of Ethno-Religious Policies on China’s 
Muslims,” 26. 
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Han-centric identity of China and change the Chinese Empire into a multiethnic conglomerate of 
peoples.42 The Republic era in China tried to create unity and retain differences by connecting all 
peoples in China are all related but that all differences are in region and religion.43  
 When the CCP came into power, minorities were prioritized as Mao Zedong disapproved 
and condemned “Han Chauvinism” or the idea of Han superiority, and openly advocated that 
China was a diverse and multiethnic country.44 However, minorities have often been subject of 
the CCP’s policies45, resulting in a lack of understanding between Han and the fifty-five 
minorities found in the China mainland.46 One result of this lack of understanding is that there is 
a belief held by some Han Chinese that leaders need to be Han because they view Chinese 
history as primarily Han-centric.47  
 With the creation of autonomous regions, Mao believed that minorities could 
revolutionize China with the prospective minorities living in those regions. The Mongolians, 
Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hui were all given autonomous regions with the CCP’s hope of 
modernization and self-government.48 The CCP invested in the minority population through 
various training and education, and they introduced socialism into the autonomous regions in the 
1950s. The minority groups that resisted these reforms and new government systems were the 
Tibetans and the Uyghurs. This is due to their ethnic differences from the Han and their distinct 
 
     42 Jennifer Ang, “Sinicizing the Uyghurs,” A Journal of Social Justice 28, no. 4 (2016): 399. 
 
     43 Ibid., 339. 
 
     44 Ibid., 339. 
 
     45 Howland, “Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy,” 172. 
 
     46 Ibid. 
 
     47 Ibid., 182. 
 
     48 Ibid., 184. 
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religious traditions.49 The atheistic worldview and emphasis on Han culture were countercultural 
to both the Uyghur and the Tibetan. At first, the CCP encouraged cultural differences but when 
Uyghur historians started to dispute the Han Chinese narrative of Uyghur history the CCP began 
to set limits and boundaries on culture, and the study of Uyghur history was made illegal.50 
One of the most important changes was that Mandarin Chinese was made the official 
language of all schools, workplaces, and in government offices.51 While this did not affect many 
of the minorities in inland China, like the Hui Muslims of Ningxia who speak Mandarin, this did 
affect the Uyghur peoples because their language is so radically different due to its Turkish root. 
This, along with other regional bans on local history, languages, and religion continued a long 
history of what is known in Chinese as Hanhua, or Sinicizing minority peoples in China to be 
gradually one people who all reflect Han culture and Han values. From keeping minorities 
completely separate to the gradual, but steady change towards creating one unified people, China 
tends to keep their minority peoples under surveillance and with limited control over themselves 
and their culture.52 
The Current Uyghur Situation 
The Uyghur people have been under Chinese control since the 1700s and have been 
under strict control for hundreds of years despite multiple rebellions and attempts to be 
independent. While the ethnic differences are important to the Uyghur narrative and situation, 
another important factor is that the Uyghur people group are Muslims and have been practicing 
Islam for hundreds of years. While their Muslim heritage was protected to a point in Qing China, 
 
     49 Howland, “Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy,” 187.  
 
     50 Ang, “Sinicizing the Uyghurs,” 401. 
 
     51 Ibid., 402. 
 
     52 Ibid., 405. 
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the CCP did not crack down on organized religion in a wide sweep until the Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Uyghurs in and outside of China in 
separatist groups began to hope for their own nation, "Turkestan" and the desire to rule 
themselves under a government that supported Islam versus openly being against any religious 
leanings increased.53 This desire has not endeared them to the CCP, especially after the fall of the 
Soviet Union when all of central Asia was released to be their own countries with Islamic 
governments, and the Uyghurs were still under the control of China.54 The ethnic peoples of 
Central Asia are similar to the Uyghur people, so some Uyghur people desire for Xinjiang to be 
separate from China.  
In 1996, the Central Asian countries near Xinjiang and China signed deals with China 
promising not to support any Uyghur separatist groups within China or outside of China.55 Due 
to the vast migrations of the Uyghurs, the diaspora of the Uyghur people in the past 400 years 
has been all over central Asia, Turkey, and in other various countries besides China. The 
Uyghurs outside of China have been a voice for freedom and separation for the Uyghur people. It 
is important to note that not all Uyghurs are untied around being separate or Islamist 
organizations, as there are many fractions of Islam within the Uyghur people and Muslims in 
China as a whole.56 The Uyghurs and Hui are united in a belief in a sense because both groups 
are Sunni Muslims, while other Muslim minorities in China such as the Kazaks who are not.57 
This is the delicate and complicated ethnic, religious, and political web woven in the 1990s of 
 
     53 Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism,” 457. 
 
     54 Ibid. 
 
     55 Ibid., 458. 
 
     56 Ibid., 457. 
 
     57 Ibid. 
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Xinjiang and complicated due to increased acts of violence and mutinies in Xinjiang in the mid-
1990s. In 1996, one Iman was killed and another Iman of the Idgah Mosque was assaulted by a 
group of Uyghur men. It is important to note that violence is connected to separatist and religious 
reasons and is not the mainstream Uyghur perspective.  
In response to these acts of violence, the CCP sent troops to Xinjiang in 1998 and began 
to round up estimated thousands of Uyghur locals and performed trials with immediate 
executions.58This began the “Strike Hard” campaign meant to stop and end Islamic extremism in 
the area. This only escalated after the September 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in the United 
States of America.59 Shortly after the attacks in America, the Chinese government published a 
document called “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and their 
Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban," which essentially stated that multitudes of Uyghur 
people around the world were terrorists connected to and funded by the Islamic extremist groups 
of the Middle East such as Al-Qaida and the Taliban and that they were a menace to society and 
China.60 This document also sought to blame the violence of the 1990s on this collection of 
terrorists. To the global media, this came as a shock and the CCP's claims were largely viewed 
with suspicion because students of Uyghur history and culture recognized that Uyghurs were 
unhappy and bitter about being under Han Chinese rule and that the violence of the 1990s 
seemed to be unprompted or was a reaction to CCP suppression.61 
 
     58 Gladney, “Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism,” 458. 
 
     59 Ibid. 
 
     60 Sean R. Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs,” Critical 
Asian Studies 50, no. 2 (2017): 232. 
 
     61 Ibid., 233. 
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The Chinese government kept publishing similar documents and eventually received 
enough attention on the subject of Uyghurs and terrorism that the United Nations and the United 
States of America were convinced of its reality and recognized the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement as a terrorist movement in 2002.62  This established the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement as an adversary in the Global War on Terror 63, giving legitimacy to the PRC's claims 
and documents about the Uyghurs. This labeling has been detrimental to the Uyghur people 
because they have been viewed as terrorists in their homeland for eighteen years now which has 
deteriorated the already complicated relationship with the Han Chinese. In the course of just ten 
years, Uyghurs went from being labeled as separatists to terrorists with virtually no 
accountability for the PRC at all. 
The next event in the Uyghur crisis was in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics. The 
PRC claimed to have discovered and thwarted an Uyghur terrorist threat that would have been 
implemented during the summer Olympics.64 Soon the PRC were claiming to have stopped 
multiple terrorist threats from the Uyghurs which was viewed as suspicious by global media and 
if the PRC was truly stopping terrorism, or if this was simply for positive press engagement.65 
Ethnic profiling was rampant, Uyghur travel was limited and they were refused hotels and places 
to stay in Beijing. Tibetans were also profiled, but Uyghurs were seen as a larger threat due to 
their religion and the fear of Islamic extremism and terrorism.66  
 
      62 Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs 234. 
 
      63 Ibid., 234. 
 
      64 Kilic Burga Kanat, "' War on Terror' as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as Terrorists in the 
People’s Republic of China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 4 (2012): 510. 
 
     65 Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs,” 237. 
 
     66 Ibid. 
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This fear only grew when an outside terrorist group sent the PRC footage of bombs 
exploding in China as a threat due to their ill-treatment of the Uyghurs. This, and a few attacks 
on the police in China, cemented the idea that all Uyghurs were terrorists. The response to these 
attacks was that the PRC rounded up an estimated 1300 Uyghurs who were arrested for terrorism 
and security crimes against China.67 One of the goals for this large number of Uyghurs arrested 
was so that the families of the "terrorists" would be punished and publicly shamed. 
In 2009, the capital city of Xinjiang, Urumqi erupted in violent protests of Uyghur 
demonstrators resulting in estimates of 197 deaths. At the time, this was the most ethnically 
charged violence in the PRC’s history68 as the Han Chinese and Uyghurs fought in the streets of 
the capital for three days.69 These riots were the build-up from Chinese security forces that had 
moved into Xinjiang and were monitoring Uyghurs.  
  The PRC responded to these events by essentially putting most of Xinjiang, with an 
emphasis on Urumqi, under martial law with heightened police and security presence. The police 
investigated and interrogated anyone who they suspected was involved with the riots. Some 
estimate that 4,000 Uyghurs were arrested two weeks after the event.70 Arrests continued for 
months after the riots and there are still Uyghur men and women unaccounted for from these 
mass arrests and detainments. The PRC also shut down the internet, phone, and texting lines for 
almost a year, leaving Uyghurs without any mode of communication to the world and to other 
parts of China. It was 2010 when limited internet and phone services were provided again.71 The 
 
     67 Hayes and Clarke, Inside Xinjiang, 67. 
 
     68 Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs,” 289. 
 
     69 Ibid., 289. 
 
     70 Ibid.  
 
     71 Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs,” 289. 
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2009 riot proved to be a turning point for Han Chinese and Uyghur relations. The Uyghur went 
from an intentionally marginalized people group to being seen as a threat due to their religion 
and the fear that their loyalty was to terrorist groups in the Middle East. From this point on, the 
PRC will no longer view the Uyghur people as a people group part of China, but as outsiders in 
their land.  
 From 2010-2013, the PRC rapidly designed and implemented extra security measures in 
Xinjiang, targeting religious institutions. Since the fear of Islamic terrorism was a large factor in 
almost all of the marginalization of the Uyghur people, mosques and other religious buildings 
were put under high security with guards and a multitude of security cameras were installed. The 
PRC advertised that they had installed 400,000 new high-grade security cameras by. 201072 New 
rules were also established that contradicted Islamic teachings in hopes that younger Uyghurs 
would start to distance themselves from their culture and religion. Soon a cycle of riots with 
immediate suppression ensued for multiple years. Uyghur people would attack a police station or 
other security-based building, and the PRC would add more cameras, arrest more men and 
women, and increase security.73 Soon the riots turned into acts of violence that mirrored terrorist 
attacks, which further cemented in Han Chinese minds that Uyghurs were simply Muslim 
terrorists.  
  In 2014 and 2015 the PRC began to launch campaigns that attacked and attempted to 
erase the Uyghurs' strong Islamic heritage. This resulted in mosque attendance being recorded 
and scrutinized. Houses were ransacked for Muslim artifacts and religious books, and the police 
tried to stop men and women from wearing traditional Islamic clothes, like prayer caps and 
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hijabs.74 Anyone who spoke out against this war on Islam was imprisoned. Uyghur young men 
were made to choose between life in the Chinese police system as a security enforcer on their 
own people, or as convicts in prison camps.75  The message that the PRC was conveying was 
absolute loyalty and devotion to the Chinese government was the only way to freedom and 
autonomy as a citizen of China. To enforce this message, the concept of “reeducating”, went 
from only being used in centers for people with drug substance abuse issues to the Uyghur 
people as a whole.76 
 The reeducation campaign was vigorously launched in 2017. Reports started to appear 
that towns in Xinjiang were slowly diminishing in population size.77 Soon it was found out that 
the people had been placed in these centers out in Western Xinjiang. The centers for reeducation 
are a series of camps filled with unknown numbers of Uyghur men, women, and children along 
with other Muslim peoples such as Kazaks and Christians as well. These reeducation or 
internment camps have been set up with the intention of “de-extremizing” the Uyghur people and 
other ethnic and Muslim minorities.78  
The global media became aware of these camps in 2017, but the PRC has denied the 
existence of these camps. In an interview in 2018, Chinese consul general in Kazakhstan, Zhang 
Wei denied the existence and stated “We do not have such an idea in China”.79 Very little is 
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known of what is in these camps due to lack of information and China’s blockage and censorship 
of anything relating to Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. The current reincarnation of the reeducation 
camps is based on a model established in 1957 as labor camps that were advertised to help 
“educate through labor” or aodong jiaoyang; laojiao in Mandarin.80 No judiciary branch needed 
to sentence a person to the labor camps, because the police or any security entity could send 
people to a camp. In the 1980s laojiao saw a revival and the PRC used them for protestors, 
dissenters, or anyone who challenged their leadership. Families or employers who suspected that 
a member was not loyal to China could even recommend people for reeducation in a laojiao. The 
laojiaos were disbanded under current CCP chairman Xi Jinping, because it seemed wrong and 
unmodern to be able to send people to labor camps without any legal sentence or formal court 
proceedings. Instead, these political reform reeducation camps have risen as the new form of 
reeducation centers in China.81 These kinds of camps started in Tibet initially in 1996 when the 
CRP began to Sinicize the Tibetans by removing Buddhist religious leaders such as monks and 
nuns and emphasized Mandarin Chinese as their main language. The former party secretary of 
Tibet, Chen Quanguo, is the current party secretary of Xinjiang. It is not a coincidence that the 
camps have followed Chen Quanguo to Western China.  
A report from one of these camps states that Uyghur people went through a fifteen-day 
training so they could undergo a “transformation”. The 42 people in this training underwent 
classes on political, criminal, and marriage law, patriotic videos, and the end results were that the 
participants were reported to have “broken out in tears” and “repented” and “vowed to be new 
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people”.82 These testimonial style reports of highly emotional repentance of a people group 
mirrors the oral histories of self-criticism which were prominent during the era of Chairman 
Mao.83 Reports over the past three to four years from various camps reveal that these camps have 
spread all over Xinjiang and have detained thousands of men and women. There appears to be an 
emphasis on how to dress in a non-Muslim fashion and sessions on how to speak in Mandarin.84   
Few reports have been leaked that show the inside of these camps, and the foreign media 
cannot get footage without being expelled from China. The only footage of the insides of the 
camp have come from PRC approved tours of facilities. These reports are regarded as suspicious 
because the PRC denied the existence of the camps for years and there is little access to Uyghurs 
who are willing to say anything that would put the PRC in a negative light.  
There has been international outrage over the existence of the reeducation camps, but 
journalists and foreigners of any kind are blocked from entering Xinjiang and updating the global 
media on what is happening to the Uyghurs. There is also a lack of details and numbers of how 
many people are detained in these camps and what is truly happening in these reeducation 
centers. To get any information, journalists have to contact their sources and informants without 
the PRC’s knowledge or it could be disastrous for the informant and there could be repercussions 
for the Uyghur people and others in the camps.  
According to Ruth Ingram, a researcher on Human rights in China, Chinese journalists 
are inviting people to Xinjiang to see the camps, but the camps shown are highly regulated and a 
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smokescreen for what is truly happening in Xinjiang.85 While this is one of the biggest human 
rights violations in recent history, there is limited information other than the disturbing facts that 
Uyghurs keep disappearing and are not heard from again.86 There are estimates of 800,000 to 
2,000,000 Uyghurs in these camps, and that the camps have expanded 400%.87 Men in Xinjiang 
are scared because they are being targeted for the camps and now are struggling with living in a 
world that has become a dystopian nightmare.88 Uyghur men and women are being offered 
money to marry into Han Chinese families, with the hopes that the Uyghur’s Islamic heritage 
will deteriorate as they marry into other cultures.  
New information on the Uyghur crisis leaks in the global stage every few months. The 
most current news uncovered by CNN is that now the PRC has destroyed many graves of 
Uyghur men and women and replaced with new graves.89 Burial is an important part of the 
Uyghur culture, and removing a body is shameful and incredibly disrespectful for Uyghurs.90 
This disrespectful act was discovered by a London based Uyghur man named Aziz Isa Elkun 
who is banned from China. Due to this ban, Aziz could not visit his father’s grave and so he 
would visit remotely via the internet and Google maps.91 The PRC was furious at CNN, created a 
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commercial campaign against Aziz, and had his elderly mother and family speak out against him 
on the China Global Television Network (CGTN).  The CGTN doctored photos of sand dunes 
where they claimed that Aziz’s father had been buried, and that the PRC had provided graves for 
him and others.92 While this new development is not about the camps, it highlights how much 
propaganda and censorship has been used in the Uyghur narrative as a way to keep the truth of 
the camps and the mistreatment of the Uyghurs far from the Han and the world. The disturbing 
of the graves of Uyghur men and women is telling of how much of this war on the Uyghurs is 
centered in culture.  
Global Response  
 When the existence of these camps came into the light, the global media was outraged 
and indignant, especially because the PRC was so insistent that the reeducation centers did not 
exist. There was also frustration that this is a repeat offense, as the PRC did this in Tibet with 
little global flack or accountability as well. The marginalization of Uyghurs and their captivity in 
their homeland has especially affected China's relationship with Islamic nations, not only 
because of a shared religion, but also a shared ethnicity.93 Turkey has been a prominent voice for 
Uyghur rights which has caused some tension between them as well.94 The Uyghur separatist 
movements inside and outside of China have used their Turkish heritage to connect them to 
modern-day Turkey, which has angered China who does not want the Uyghurs to have their own 
nation out of their homeland. 
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 Global media has been quite persistent in updates, but due to the censorship and blockage 
of westerners to the Xinjiang region it is hard to get up to date and true information, but effort is 
being put into gathering information and Uyghur interviews.95 However, the global public at 
large is still fairly uneducated about what is happening to the Uyghurs and the importance of the 
camps and about the lack of religious freedom in China. There is a lack of publicity and 
information on this that is reported in mainstream media. There is also the issue of what is being 
written about the Uyghur people, and the media being spread in China about the Uyghur people. 
Beijing is claiming that all Uyghurs are terrorists and want nothing more than to hurt the Chinese 
people. Every other media source is stating that the Uyghurs are a marginalized people who have 
been lied about and are unjustly being held in reeducation camps for the sole purpose of 
Sinicization96 and to control and eventually end Islam in China. Overall, voices are speaking up 
for the injustice of the Uyghur crisis, but they are often hindered from returning to China to 
gather new information or the footage and interviews about the Uyghurs rarely makes it to the 
forefront of global news, even though this is one of the biggest humanitarian and freedom of 
religion crises in the past fifteen years.   
Conclusion  
 The current Uyghur crisis is complicated and multilayered with multiple perspectives and 
multiple governments invested in the fate of the Uyghur people. Moreover, this is more than an 
issue of ethnicity, but it also has a strong foundation in the religious differences of the Han 
Chinese and the Uyghur, which has spanned centuries. The Qing dynasty, who were also 
minorities in China, attempted segregation of the Uyghurs and the Han. The PRC on the other 
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hand initially attempted to merge the Uyghur culture into the greater mass of China as one 
culture in a multiethnic nation.97  
However, this failed due to the differences and an unwillingness to become Sinicized98 
through schools and universities and forced "reforms.” This is where the Uyghur narrative is 
currently, a people in reeducation camps and few advocates. The nation who they are under is 
actively attempting to mold them to a culture compatible with communist beliefs so there is 
essentially no freedom of religion for anyone, but especially Muslims. What went from an 
accommodation of Islam for the Uyghur and other Islamic cultures like the Hui and Kazakh has 
turned into separation and isolation until they align themselves to the standard of Han culture. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with Han culture, however, when a people group is forced to 
forgo centuries of cultural heritage it becomes an issue.99   
There is also the added problem of Islamic extremists connecting themselves to the 
Uyghurs and China's reaction to the threat of violence and foreign threat. Overall, the Uyghur 
crisis has multiple issues involved, but one of the main problems deals with a lack of 
accountability for China as a nation and the need for advocacy for the Uyghur people. The 
reeducation camps have ripped apart families and have damaged thousands of people due to the 
upheaval of life and destruction of cultural and religious traditions. 
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